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Since it was proposed by Fearon (1994), audience cost the-
ory has received much scholarly attention. One of the cen-
tral hypotheses is that regimes whose sustainability is 
subject to public support (“audience cost-sensitive 
regimes”) can make threats more credible to foreign oppo-
nents than those that are autonomous of public support 
(Fearon, 1994; Kurizaki and Whang, 2015; Weeks, 2008). 
Issuing threats publicly and subsequently backing down 
will result in a public backlash against leaders (i.e., audi-
ence costs). If foreign opponents know this, they will per-
ceive threats from leaders in audience cost-sensitive 
regimes as credible, and thereby will be more likely to back 
down. Consequently, audience cost-sensitive regimes are 
more likely to succeed in coercive diplomacy.
This article proposes a new direction for audience cost 
research, examining whether the state of the domestic 
economy conditions the effect of audience costs on the 
probability of successful coercive diplomacy. The motiva-
tion is simple: as public opinion research has shown, 
domestic audiences evaluate the performance of their lead-
ers based both on foreign policy and on the domestic econ-
omy (McAvoy, 2006; Ostrom et al., 2018; Wang and Cheng, 
2015). In particular, empirical models in Ostrom et al. 
(2018) imply that the effects of foreign policy performance 
and economic policy performance on leadership approval 
are additive to one another; for example, the negative effect 
of poor foreign policy performance will be reduced by the 
positive effect of good economic policy performance.1 The 
implication for audience cost theory is that, if the domestic 
economy is doing well, an audience cost-sensitive regime 
should be more able to afford failure in an international cri-
sis than when the domestic economy is doing badly. Under 
the conditions of a good economy, citizens will tolerate 
failure in an international crisis; it is a risk for citizens to 
replace a leader who is helping the economy just because 
she has failed in an international crisis, as there is no guar-
antee that the leader who follows will be able to sustain the 
same economic performance. Under the conditions of a 
poor economy, on the other hand, an international crisis 
would be a leader’s last chance to gain popular support, and 
failure would be the last blow.
I am not arguing that leaders in audience cost-sensitive 
regimes ignore audience costs when the economy is good, 
or that, when the economy is good, leaders in audience 
cost-sensitive regimes are as immune from audience costs 
as leaders who are not in audience cost-sensitive regimes. 
Even when the economy is good, leaders in audience 




Does the state of the domestic economy change the size of the effect of audience costs? As public opinion research 
has shown, citizens assess the performance of their leaders based not only on foreign policy, but also on the domestic 
economy. Thus, if leaders are subject to audience costs, they should be even less able to afford failure in an international 
crisis when the economy is performing badly than when the economy is doing well. As a result, such leaders should be 
even more able to make their threats credible and, therefore, are more likely to be successful in coercive diplomacy. 
This novel prediction finds no empirical support in a replication study using Moon and Souva (2016). I discuss possible 
reasons for this result and avenues for further research.
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cost-sensitive regimes may well care about audience costs, 
and may well be more sensitive to those costs than leaders 
not in audience cost-sensitive regimes. My argument is that 
leaders in audience cost-sensitive regimes should incur 
smaller audience costs from backing down in a crisis when 
the economy is good than when the economy is poor; there-
fore, these leaders should be more likely to prefer backing 
down to fighting in a crisis because audience costs may not 
be large enough to make the expected cost of war lower 
than that of peace after backing down.2
If the opposing country is meant to interpret the credibil-
ity of signals from the other side based on audience costs, 
then the success or otherwise of the economy in an audi-
ence cost-sensitive regime should differentiate the extent to 
which the opposing country sees as credible a threat issued 
by the audience cost-sensitive regime. The predictions are 
as follows. On the one hand, when facing a crisis initiated 
by an audience cost-sensitive regime that is doing well eco-
nomically, the opposing country should be less likely to see 
the threat as credible. This is because a good economy 
allows leaders in audience cost-sensitive regimes to incur 
relatively small audience costs from backing down in a cri-
sis. Thus, the opposing country is more likely to believe 
that, for the leader of the audience cost-sensitive regime, 
the expected cost of war is higher than the expected cost of 
peace after backing down (= small audience costs), leaving 
the threat non-credible. On the other hand, when facing a 
crisis initiated by an audience cost-sensitive regime that is 
doing badly economically, the opposing country should be 
more likely to see the threat as credible. This is because a 
poor economy increases the size of audience costs that 
leaders in audience cost-sensitive regimes incur from back-
ing down in a crisis. Thus, the opposing country is more 
likely to believe that, for the leader of the audience cost- 
sensitive regime, the expected cost of war is lower than the 
expected cost of peace after backing down (= large audi-
ence costs), making the threat credible. In short, I anticipate 
that a good economy in audience cost-sensitive regimes 
should weaken the effect of audience costs on the probabil-
ity of successful coercive diplomacy, while a poor economy 
should strengthen this effect.
I examine these novel predictions empirically as a new 
direction for research on audience cost theory. In order to 
increase confidence in the causal argument of a theory, it is 
valuable to “test as many relevant implications of a causal 
theory as possible” (Keele, 2015: 327). Thus, if we find 
empirical evidence for the above predictions, we might be 
more confident in the causal argument of audience cost 
theory. If we do not find such evidence, we should ask why 
this is so. Thus, rather than directly testing the original ver-
sion of audience cost theory, the article capitalizes on the 
novel predictions to present a way forward to develop the 
theory further.
To this end, I replicate Moon and Souva (2016), one of 
the latest studies on audience costs and the success of 
coercive diplomacy. Replication is a productive way to 
accumulate scientific knowledge, since readers can attrib-
ute any difference in the results to the modification alone, 
rather than to different estimators, different measures or 
different datasets. I use multiple measures of the state of the 
domestic economy for robustness: annual GDP growth rate, 
biannual GDP growth rate, annual per capita GDP growth 
rate and biannual per capita GDP growth rate.
In short, the replication finds no empirical support for 
the theoretical expectations here. The finding is important, 
given the high level of scholarly attention to audience cost 
theory and the widespread consensus, endorsed by both 
observational and experimental studies, that audience costs 
do exist (e.g., Kertzer and Brutger, 2016; Kurizaki and 
Whang, 2015; Moon and Souva, 2016; Levy et al., 2015; 
Tomz, 2007; Weeks, 2008). In the concluding section, I dis-
cuss possible reasons for the finding that the state of the 
domestic economy does not condition the effect of audi-
ence costs as expected.
The article is structured as follows. First, I develop the 
theoretical discussion and address several potential criti-
cisms of my predictions. Next, I explain the research design 
and the results of the empirical analysis. The final section 
discusses the implications of the findings.
Theoretical discussion
Much quantitative research has been done to test audience 
cost theory empirically, albeit with some modifications 
regarding the exact mechanisms and specific conditions 
(Kertzer and Brutger, 2016; Kurizaki and Whang, 2015; 
Levendusky and Horowitz, 2012; Potter and Baum, 2014; 
Levy et al., 2015; Moon and Souva, 2016; Tomz, 2007; 
Uzonyi et al., 2012; Weeks, 2008). However, these studies 
assume that citizens care about foreign policy success or 
failure alone when evaluating their leaders. Yet, public 
opinion research has shown that citizens decide whether or 
not to support leaders based on both economic and foreign 
policies (McAvoy, 2006; Ostrom et al., 2018; Wang and 
Cheng, 2015). My expectation is that, if the domestic econ-
omy is doing well, failure in foreign issues is less important 
to citizens than when it is doing badly. Thus, the state of the 
domestic economy should be a “domestic political environ-
ment within states [that] shapes the size and extent of audi-
ence costs” (Levendusky and Horowitz, 2012: 324).
The literature has found that the exact mechanisms by 
which citizens impose audience costs may be different, 
depending on who they are. For example, the nature of 
audience costs may differ among different constituencies – 
such as hawks punishing a leader for backing down and 
doves punishing a leader’s use of threat (Kertzer and 
Brutger, 2016). In addition, people with strong policy pref-
erences may not punish a leader who fails to fulfill her ini-
tial promise as long as their policy preferences are satisfied 
(Chaudoin, 2014). Yet, it is also plausible to say that the 
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public in general – both the rich and the poor – prefer a 
healthy economy over a bad economy.
Three criticisms of my theoretical predictions are possi-
ble, pointing out that the direction of the conditioning effect 
of the domestic economy is the opposite of what I predict. 
First, the public might not be interested in foreign affairs 
when the economy is poor; they might be able to pay more 
attention to foreign affairs when the economy is strong. 
Thus, it might be the case that a poor economy reduces the 
effect size of audience costs and a healthy economy 
increases it. However, this argument is inconsistent with 
the logic of audience cost theory. The theory argues that, 
when the government initiates an international crisis, it 
becomes a public matter: “Measures such as troop deploy-
ments and public threats make crises public events in which 
domestic audiences observe and assess the performance of 
the leadership” (Fearon, 1994: 577). Thus, if we follow the 
logic of the theory, once a leader starts an international cri-
sis, citizens should assess her performance through the out-
come of the crisis, even when the economy is poor.
Second, it might be argued that, when a leader initiates a 
crisis in the situation of a poor economy, she is already 
deemed to lose office precisely because of that economic 
situation and, therefore, backing down will not be costly. 
Consequently, the opposing country will not take the threat 
as credible and will not back down. However, while a 
leader facing a poor economy is certainly less likely to 
retain her incumbency, she also has to think about her post-
tenure position (Baturo, 2014). If leaders leave their office 
with at least a triumph in an international crisis despite eco-
nomic difficulties, they will have better prospects in the 
post-tenure period. In democracies, they will increase their 
chances of finding a good job in other sectors. In autocra-
cies, they will, at the very least, not be punished as badly as 
those who have achieved neither foreign nor domestic suc-
cess; and they might increase their chances of garnering 
some respect from the military and hardliners, securing 
their post-tenure circumstances. In short, for leaders the 
political cost of backing down is added to the already exist-
ing political cost of a poor economy.
Third, it might be argued that, when the economy is 
doing well, the country has more to lose through war than 
when it is doing badly; therefore, it is a costly signal for a 
country with a flourishing economy to engage in a crisis. 
This argument is, however, about the effect of the state of 
the domestic economy in general, not about its condition-
ing effect on audience costs. The question in this article is 
how the public assesses a leader’s performance in an inter-
national crisis in combination with the state of the economy. 
If the economy is doing well and, the country therefore has 
more to lose, the public may actually praise a leader who 
backs down in a crisis and avoids the economic cost of war. 
Of course, the leader may still incur some audience cost, 
since she will have initiated a crisis and failed to achieve 
the objective. The point is that the size of audience cost is 
much larger if a leader does the same thing when the econ-
omy is doing badly. In such a case, the public has nothing 
to praise in their leader; she has initiated an international 
crisis, despite it being a time when the government should 
have been paying attention to the economy, and she has not 
even managed to obtain anything from the crisis!
In short, it is plausible to expect that a healthy economy 
will decrease the effect size of audience costs, and a poor 
economy will increase it. It then follows that opposing coun-
tries should be less likely to back down when facing crises 
initiated by audience cost-sensitive regimes that are doing 
well economically; and that opposing countries should be 
more likely to back down when facing a crisis initiated by 
audience cost-sensitive regimes that are doing badly eco-
nomically. I test these predictions empirically below.
Empirical analysis
As I mentioned above I replicate Moon and Souva (2016), 
who examine the effect of audience costs on the probability 
of failed threats using the Militarized Compellent Threats 
(MCT) data (Sechser, 2011). Downes and Sechser (2012) 
argue that the commonly used Militarized Interstate 
Disputes data (Palmer et al., 2015) are not an appropriate 
measure of coercive threats and that empirical models using 
them to test audience cost theory are flawed. Using the 
MCT data, Downes and Sechser reported that democracies 
are no more likely to be successful in coercive diplomacy 
than autocracies.
Yet, Moon and Souva (2016) argue that audience costs 
are a mechanism to reduce information asymmetry as a 
costly signal, thus separating the disputes caused by infor-
mation asymmetry from those caused by commitment 
problems (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 2006). Using the MCT 
data, Moon and Souva (2016) successfully recover the 
association between audience costs and coercive diplo-
macy in those disputes caused by information asymmetry.3
Their dependent variable is threat failure, coded 1 if a 
threat fails and 0 if a threat succeeds. Moon and Souva 
(2016) use the Audience Cost Capacity Index (Uzonyi 
et al., 2012) to measure the sensitivity of regimes to audi-
ence costs. They dichotomize this index into high versus 
low audience cost capacities. This variable is then used in 
combination with whether or not a disputed issue is strate-
gic territory. Moon and Souva (2016) argue that disputes 
over strategic territory are about commitment problems 
rather than a result of incomplete information. The two-by-
two combination of high versus low audience cost capacity 
and the presence versus absence of disputed strategic terri-
tory produces a total of four binary regressors (one being 
the baseline category in the regression models). Moon and 
Souva (2016) find that only when states have a high audi-
ence cost capacity and disputed issues are not over strategic 
territories are they more likely to make coercive diplomacy 
successful.
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I add to their empirical models the interaction term 
between the category of high audience cost capacity and no 
strategic territory and each of the four measures for the 
state of the domestic economy: annual GDP growth, bian-
nual GDP growth, annual per capita GDP growth and bian-
nual per capita GDP growth. The expectation is that a lower 
growth rate should increase the effect size of the category 
of high audience cost capacity and no strategic territory that 
enables states to coerce a target state by threat. The data on 
GDP and GDP per capita are from Gleditsch (2002, ver. 6.0 
is used). The distributions of these variables are shown as 
histograms in Figure 1 for all used observations and in 
Figure 2 for the observations of the category of high audi-
ence cost capacity and no strategic territory. The distribu-
tions are fairly similar in both cases, suggesting that the 
estimation of the interaction effect is not significantly 
affected by the unequal distribution or variation over the 
presence or absence of the conditioning variable.
In the literature on the diversionary use of force, the esti-
mation issue has been pointed out that not all leaders are 
Figure 1. Histograms of the economic growth variables.
Figure 2. Histograms of the economic growth variables (where the category of high audience cost capacity and no strategic 
territory = 1).
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equally blamed for a poor economy – e.g., those who have 
just assumed office after the economy has already been 
stagnating for a while (Johnson and Barnes, 2011). This 
issue does not apply here. Even if a leader is not blamed for 
a poor economy ex ante (which poses a challenge to the 
estimation of the effect of a poor economy on dispute ini-
tiation), once she has initiated a crisis (as in the case of this 
article as well as other works on audience cost theory that 
use crisis episodes as the unit of analysis) the poor econ-
omy should still strengthen the effect of audience costs. 
This is because citizens will associate foreign policy failure 
with the poor economy ex post, concluding that it was inap-
propriate for the leader to initiate a crisis when the domestic 
economy needed attention.
Table 1 presents the results. In Model 1, the replica-
tion is done without adding any growth rate variable, but 
excluding the observations that are dropped when the 
annual growth rate variables are used because of the 
availability of GDP data (only from 1952 onwards). This 
is to show that the reduced number of observations does 
Table 1. Logit regression of failed threats.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
High audience cost, no strategic territory −1.325* −1.196 −0.725 −1.162 −1.029
 (0.0822) (0.274) (0.485) (0.190) (0.217)
Annual GDP growth −4.671  
 (0.125)  
High audience cost, no strategic territory −0.693  
× Annual GDP growth (0.969)  
Biannual GDP growth −1.410  
 (0.570)  
High audience cost, no strategic territory −16.68  
× Biannual GDP growth (0.342)  
Annual per capita GDP growth −5.562  
 (0.118)  
High audience cost, no strategic territory −0.810  
× Annual per capita GDP growth (0.968)  
Biannual per capita GDP growth −1.956
 (0.451)
High audience cost, no strategic territory −17.94
× Biannual per capita GDP growth (0.286)
High audience cost, strategic territory 0.626 0.770 0.731 0.795 0.723
 (0.516) (0.411) (0.468) (0.396) (0.473)
Low audience cost, strategic territory 0.707 0.804 1.045 0.845 1.061
 (0.408) (0.349) (0.279) (0.337) (0.275)
Major–major dyad −1.291 −1.240 −1.456 −1.193 −1.428
 (0.313) (0.314) (0.263) (0.331) (0.272)
Major–minor dyad 0.668 0.747 0.647 0.816 0.777
 (0.616) (0.556) (0.615) (0.514) (0.556)
Minor–major dyad −0.397 −0.331 −0.516 −0.282 −0.488
 (0.704) (0.754) (0.627) (0.792) (0.649)
Power ratio 1.139 1.168 0.797 1.193 0.766
 (0.301) (0.289) (0.490) (0.282) (0.506)
Contiguity −0.172 −0.238 −0.163 −0.241 −0.218
 (0.812) (0.747) (0.827) (0.742) (0.774)
Alliance portfolio similarity 0.874 0.969 0.954 0.953 0.905
 (0.433) (0.374) (0.416) (0.382) (0.438)
Alliance similarity initiator 1.169 1.034 1.228 1.009 1.239
 (0.251) (0.308) (0.234) (0.318) (0.230)
Alliance similarity target −3.487* −3.650* −3.607* −3.655* −3.631*
 (0.00256) (0.00168) (0.00146) (0.00158) (0.00128)
Constant −0.336 −0.256 −0.111 −0.381 −0.0426
 (0.806) (0.846) (0.940) (0.773) (0.977)
Observations 94 94 93 94 93
Note: p-values by two-tailed tests in parentheses; * p < 0.1.
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not cause the category of high audience cost capacity and 
no strategic territory to lose its presumed effect on the 
probability of successful coercive diplomacy. As 
expected, this category is associated with a lower proba-
bility of failed threats.
In the remaining models, each of the economic growth 
rate variables interacts with the category of high audience 
cost capacity and no strategic territory. As is clear from the 
table, none of the interaction terms has the p < 0.1 level of 
statistical significance by two-tailed tests. And, more 
importantly, the sign of their coefficients is opposite to the 
theoretical expectation. Because the interaction term 
between a continuous variable and a binary variable indi-
cates the effect of the continuous variable conditional on 
the binary variable taking the value of one, it substantively 
means that (if there is any conditioning effect of the state of 
the economy) a higher growth rate decreases the probabil-
ity of failed threats, provided that a regime is sensitive to 
audience costs and the disputed issue is not over strategic 
territory. The same conclusion can be drawn if I estimate 
the average marginal effect of the category of high audi-
ence cost capacity and no strategic territory across the full 
range of each of the growth rate variables (the results are 
available in the online Appendix). The category has a larger 
effect to reduce the probability of failed threats when the 
growth rate variables take higher values (i.e., when the 
economy is doing well). Thus, the theoretical expectations 
receive no empirical support.
The small sample size might explain the wide standard 
errors, and therefore the statistical insignificance. But it 
cannot explain why the direction of the effect is opposite to 
the theoretical expectation, unless a different time period is 
meant to exert a different effect of audience costs. The 
MCT dataset covers all compellent threats made by states 
against other states from 1918 to 2001, and the empirical 
models here run from 1952 to 2001. If including either the 
pre-1952 or post-2001 period would indeed change the sign 
of the coefficient of the interaction term to the opposite 
(i.e., from minus to plus, meaning that greater economic 
growth increases the probability of failed threats by audi-
ence cost-sensitive regimes), this would indicate significant 
causal heterogeneity between the coercive threats from 
1952 to 2001 and those outside that period. However, many 
previous studies include, or even explicitly focus on this 
period, finding empirical evidence for audience costs (e.g., 
Haynes, 2012; Moon and Souva, 2016; Weeks, 2008). 
Thus, it is inconsistent to argue that audience costs do not 
work during the period.
Conclusion
The finding of this article poses a new question: why does 
the state of the domestic economy not affect the effect size 
of audience costs? I point to two potential avenues for fur-
ther research.
First, it might be the case that opposing countries do not 
correctly interpret the costly signal of audience costs from 
the other side given its domestic economy. Experimental 
research has found that citizens are indeed willing to punish 
a leader who backs down in a crisis (e.g., Kertzer and 
Brutger, 2016; Levy et al., 2015; Tomz, 2007). However, it 
also implies that the opposing state in the crisis may not 
always interpret the implication of the audience cost for the 
leader (i.e., hand-tying and therefore supposedly credible) 
in the same way as is done by the theory (Yarhi-Milo et al., 
forthcoming).4 Previous observational research suggests 
that institutional characteristics, such as regime types, 
allow the implication of audience costs for the leader to be 
interpreted by the opposing country in the theoretically 
expected way (e.g., Haynes, 2012; Moon and Souva, 2016; 
Weeks, 2008). This article indicates that the state of the 
domestic economy does not do so. It is possible that institu-
tional characteristics, which are usually a static factor, are 
easier for opposing countries to interpret than the state of 
the domestic economy, which is a more dynamic factor.
Second, there may be a variation in how the average 
citizen weighs foreign and economic affairs when evalu-
ating her leader. This kind of research has already been 
called for in the area of comparative politics (e.g., 
Gallagher and Hanson, 2015: 378–381). For example, if 
the average citizen is a hardliner who cares about national 
pride much more than about economic prosperity, her 
leader may be able to generate audience costs better and, 
therefore, is likely to be more successful in coercive 
diplomacy regardless of the state of the domestic econ-
omy. If this were indeed the case, it might be the reason 
why, in the material produced in this article, I did not find 
the theoretically expected conditioning effect of the state 
of the domestic economy.
In short, focusing on the state of the domestic economy, 
this article has presented novel implications for the litera-
ture on audience costs.
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Notes
1. Whether foreign policy performance or economic policy per-
formance has a larger effect on public support depends on 
contexts (Edwards et al., 1995; Ostrom et al., 2018), but the 
point still holds that good performance in one policy domain 
mitigates the negative effect of poor performance in the other 
policy domain.
2. “Smaller audience costs” may mean a small rather than large 
decrease in the likelihood of a leader staying in office (or 
a small rather than large decrease in the likelihood of the 
leader securing good post-tenure life, if the leader is con-
cerned about post-tenure life rather than re-election, as in the 
case of term-limited leaders). While Tarar and Leventoglu 
(2013) imply that medium-sized audience costs can some-
times help coercive diplomacy, their model also suggests that 
small audience costs are ineffective.
3. I also tested my theoretical predictions using Weeks’s 
(2008) replication data, which use the Militarized Interstate 
Disputes data. I discuss the results and their implications 
in the online Appendix. In short, the results are, at best, 
controversial.
4. Snyder and Borghard (2011) also show the same point 
through historical case studies.
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